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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER and 
DONALD S. COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. CIV 3-76-48 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
provides: 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR RECOVERY OF EXPERT 
WITNESS FEES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §l540(g) (4) 
The Court, in issuing any fina: order 1n 
any suit brought pursuant to paragraph {l) 
of this subsection, may award costs of 
litigation {including reasonable attorney 
and expert witness fees) to any party 
whenever the court determines such award 
is appropriate. 
To award Plaintiffs their costs of litigation would be 
consonant with Congressional intent and appropriate under the 
standard developed by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the items 
of cost as set forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Bill of Costs are 
proper items for such an award and reflect reasonable requests. 
I. Awarding Plaintiffs Their Costs of Litigation Pursuant to 
16 u.s.c. §l504{g) (4) Is Appropr1ate. 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v Wilderness Society, 
421 u.s. 240 {1975) the Supreme Court held that absent a 
guidance (is necessary] to consider some statutes important and 
others unimportant and to allow attorney's fees only in connection 
with the former ... 421 u.s. at 263-64. 
The Supreme Court has also held, however, that when 
Congress does provide authority for the award of litigation costs, 
a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily be awarded such costs 
unless an award would be unjust. Although no.court has addressed 
the counsel fee provision of the Endangered Species Act, in 
Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 u.s. 400 (1968), the 
Court considered a substantially in<;lentical fee-award statute ---
authorizing the award of fees under Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The Court of Appeals had held that the prevailing 
plaintiffs should be awarded costs "only to the extent that the 
respondents' defenses had been advanced 'for purposes of delay 
and not in good faith."' 390 U.S. at 401. The Supreme Court 
expressly rejected this subjective standard because the formula 
failed to give effect to Congressional in~ent. The Court noted: 
When a plaintiff brings an action under 
that Title, he cannot recover damages. 
If he obtains an injunction, he does so 
not for himself alone but also as a 
11 private attorney·general," vindicating 
a policy that Congress considered of the 
highest priority. If successful plaintiffs 
were routinely forced to bear their own 
attorney's fees, few aggrieved parties 
would be in a position to advance the 
public interest by invoking the injunctive 
powers of the federal courts. 390 U.S. 
at 402 (footnotes omitted). 
The Supreme Court then set the standard for determining the 
appropriateness of statutorily authorized counsel-fee awards in 
citizen suits: 
It follows that one who succeeds in 
obtaining an injuction under that 
Title should ordinarily reccver an 
attorney's fee unless special 
circumstances would render such an 
award unjust. 390 u.s~ at 402 
(emphasis added) • 
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v Moody, 422 U.S.405 (1975) (applying 
the Newman standard to awards under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964); Northcross v Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 
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427, 428 (1973) (applying the Newman standard to awards under 
the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972); Christiansburg Garment Co. 
v E.E.o.c., 98 s.ct. 694, 697-98 (1978) (dicta). 
The Endangered Species Act is one of only a small 
number of federal acts that expressly authorize the award of 
litigation costs by district courts. 
The act thus shows a Congressional desire to support 
citizen suits that promote the policy of the act and to relieve 
the financial burden of private enforcement. Cf. Arthur v 
Nyquist, 426 F. Supp 194 {D.N.Y. 1977) (Emergency School Aid Act 
§718). In accord with Newman, litigation costs should be awarded 
to prevailing citizen plaintiffs under the Endangered Species Act 
in all but special circumstances. 
Plaintiffs' suit against T.V.A. clearly furthered the 
Congressional policy of conserving "the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend." 16 u.s.c. 
§1531 (b). Indeed, this conclusion is implicit in the Supreme 
Court's holding in T.V.A. v Hill, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2301-02 (1978). 
Plaintiffs' suit not only prevented a serious violation of federal 
law but also yielded significant collateral benefits. By 
highlighting an apparent conflict between statutes, plaintiffs 
secured clarification of a complex and important issue of law 
under the Endangered Species Act. Furthermore, plaintiffs' 
suit preserved the ability of Congress to make a legislative 
resolution of the Snail Darter-Tellico Darn issue. 
Finally, there are no "special circumstances [that] 
would render such an award unjust. 11 Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, Inc., 390 u.s. 400, 402 (1968). Plaintiffs brought 
suit in good faith,· and, as evidenced by the Supreme Courts' 
ruling in T.V.A. v Hill, the claim was not frivolous. An award 
of attorney fees pursuant to statute should not be denied simply 
because a plaintiff himself performs some of the professional 
services. In Holly v Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976) the 
court held that a complainant who prevailed in an action under 
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the Freedom of Information Act was entitled to recover attorney 
fees for time spent as his own counsel as well as for the time 
spent by separate counsel on complainant's behalf. Even the 
fact that a plaintiff may be under no obligation to compensate 
counsel is not a proper ground for denyin$ an award of attorney 
fees. Torres v Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir. 1976) (Voting Rights 
Act of 1965). Absent 11 Special circumstances," the Newman 
standardentitles plaintiffs to an award of litigation costs 
pursuant to 16 u.s.c. §1540 (g) (4). 
II. The Items of Cost Set Forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Bill 
of Costs are Proper Items for Award and Reflect Reasonable 
Requests. 
As will be shown, each type of expense claimed by 
plaintiffs is a compensable cost of litigation. Each expense 
item represents the actual cost incurred. Moreover, the 
attorney's fees requested by plaintiffs are reasonable in light 
of the nature of this case and the prevailing fee rate. 
A. Attorney's Fees 
The Endangered Species Act, 16 u.s.c. §1540 {g) {4) 
expressly includes reasonable attorney fees as a compensable 
cost of litigation. The attorney fees requested by plaintiffs' 
counsel are presented in Items 5,6, and 8 of Plaintiffs' Verified 
Bill of Costs. The most often used guidelines for determining 
reasonable attorney fees in this type of ca.se are set down in 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 {5th Cir. 
1974). The factors to be considered are: 
1) time and labor required; 
2) novelty and diff-iculty of the legal questions 
involved; 
3) skill required; 
4) preclusion of other employment due to acceptance 
of the case; 
5) usual fee for similar work in the community; 
6) whether fee was fixed or contingenti 
7) time limitations involvedi 
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8) amount involved and results obtained; 
9) experience, reputation.and ability of counsel; 
10) undesirability of the case; 
11) nature and length of professiona relationship; 
with client; 
12} fee awards in similar cases; 
488 F.2d at 717-19. See also Carter v Montgomery Ward & Co., 
76 F.R.D. 565 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); B7andenburger v Thompson, 494 
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Srnith v.Chapman, 436 F._ Supp. 58 (W.D. Te:M. 1977). 
Factors 6,7,11, and 12 would appear innapposite to the present 
case. An item by item review of the remaining factors, however, 
shows that the fees requested by plaintiff are certainly reasonabl • 
As shown in plaintiffs' Verified Bill of Costs a 
considerable amount of time and labor were required for this suit. 
Indeed Prof. Plater devoted approximately 735 hours of pro bono 
publico work on top of the. 249 total hours included in the bill 
of costs. 
Few cases have ever presented more novel or difficult 
legal questions than did Hill v-Tennessee Valley Authority. The 
case •·vas \vi thout precedent. Na.ticna:'.. attention focused on the 
battle of a three inch fish agains·c the T. V .A. and a 110 million 
dollar project. The. case presented questions that ultimately 
had to be resolved by the Supreme Court •. 
The successful pursuit of plaintiffs'- claim also 
required considerable skill. In additi.on to the highly complex 
issues presented, plaintiffs were pitted against the formidable 
resources and talents of-the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
United States Department of Justice. 
It i_s impossible to determine with certainty the extent 
to which plainti.ffs' counsel was precluded from accepting other 
employment. In light of the tLffie and labor involved, however, 
a substantial preclusive effect is undeniab::'_e. 
Similarly, no 11 usual fee" tor suits under the 
Endangered Species Act has been established .in this or any other 
community. Most certainly, ho\vever, the request of plaintiffs'-
counsel for reimbursement at $75.00 per hour is well within the 
normal rate range for this community. In applying fee authori-
zation provisions almost identical to those of the Endangered 
Species Act, the court in Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v 
Callaway, 429 F. Supp 1136 (D.R.I. 1977), noted that fee awards 
were to be competitive with prevailing rates in the community. 
See also Baughman v ~vilson Freight Forward}:ng C'?_:_, 79 F. R. D. 520 
(W.D. Pa.l978) ($50.00 per hour proper rate for period 1972 to 
1976 in Allegheny County, Pa.); Oliver v Kalamazoo Board of 
Education, 73 F.R.D. 30 (W.D. Mich. 1976) ($40 to $100 per hour 
billing rates resulted in base figures of $283, 925.00 and 
ultimate award of $507,067.00) (Emergency School Aid Act). $75.00 
per hour is, at most, competitive with prevailing rates in this 
community. 
Plaintiffs' request remains reasonable in light of the 
eighth factor set forth in Johnson. The efforts of counsel 
ultimately yielded the exact relief prescribed by Congress and 
desired by plaintiff. The permanent injunction against closure 
of Tellico Dam has preserved the Snail Darter for a legislative 
resolution of the issue. 
The attorney's fees requested are also reasonable in 
light of the experience, reputation and ability of counsel. 
w. P. Boone Dougherty is an experienced trial and appellate 
attorney with an excellent reputation. He has practiced law for 
18 years and has frequently appeared in this court. Zygmunt 
J. B. Plater is a former professor of law at the University of 
Tennessee College of Law and is currently professor at Wayne 
State University Law College. He has published numerous works 
in the field of federal environmental law and is a recognized ---
expert consultant on environmental law issues, 
Finally, determining reasonable attorney'· s fees 
requires consideration of the undesirability of the case. The 
Tellico Dam-Snail Darter controversy polarized public opinion. 
Emotions ran high on both sides of the issue throughout the 
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surrounding area. Despite the worthiness of plaintiffs' cause, 
public pressure, fueled. by extensive media· coverage, was intense·. 
Serving as counsel in such a case inevitably risks the alienation 
of a large segment of the community. 
B. Transcript and Depositions Costs 
Plaintiffs' ccsts for transcription and depositions 
are presented in items 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' Verified Bill of 
Costs. The award of both types of cost is within the sound 
discretion of the court. See ~ Viverette v Lurleen B. Wallace 
State Junior College, 587 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1978) (transcript); 
Postow v Oriental Building Ass'n, 455 F. Supp 781 (D.D.C. 1978) 
(depositions); Dasher v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 78 F.R.D. 
142 (D. Ga. 1978} (deposition costs including travel expenses 
are allowable} • The costs incurred were necessary not only for 
the trial of this suit but also for the appellate proceedings 
thereafter. 
c. Appellate Costs 
Plaintiffs' various costs on appeal are presented in 
items 1,2,6,7,9, and 10 of plaintiffs' Verified Bill of Costs. 
The award of appellate costs is also within the sound discretion 
of the court. Souza v Southworth, 561 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977); 
Panior v Iberville Parish School Board, 543 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 
1976). Note that plaintiffs' appellate costs include 80 hours 
~ ,, 
of work by research assistants in preparing plaintiffs' brief 
to the Supreme Court. Such research expense is also allowable 
in an award of costs. Barnette v Pritzker, 73 F.R.D. 430 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (paralegal expense); Oliver v Kalamazoo Board 
of Education, 73 F.R.D. 30 (W.D. Mich. 1976) ($15,000.00 for 1500 
hours work by research assistant). An award of costs·fo:,= appeal 
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is especially proper in this case. The promotion of Congressional 
policy and the collateral benefits of plaintiffs' suit {discussed 
in Argument I) are a direct result of plaintiffs' successful 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit and argument before the Supreme 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Newman the 
plaintiffs should be awarded-~egal-fees unless special 
circumstances render the award unjust. Since no such special 
circumstances exist in the present case, an award of the proper 
and reasonable litigation costs to plaintiffs is appropriate 
under the Endangered Species Act, 16 u.s.c. §1540 {g) {4). 
This 26th day of June, 1979. 
W. P. BOONE DOUGHERTY 
PETER ALLI~N 
~r],gL; 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
904 Burwell Building 
602 Gay Street 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 
{ 615 ) 6 : 7-6 2 58 
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